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RECONCILING THE OLD THEORY
AND THE NEW EVIDENCE
Comments on Ronald Mann's
'The Role of Letters of Credit in Payment Transactions'
Jacob L Corre*
Ronald Mann's thorough research and rigorous analysis provide
compelling evidence that the commercial letter of credit does not fur
ther the fundamental purpose traditionally associated with it.1 Equally
persuasive are his hypotheses about the functions that letters of credit
actually serve in the real world. The objective statistics are startling.
An overwhelming majority of letter of credit seller-beneficiaries make
at least initial presentations to issuing or correspondent banks that by
the express terms of the letter of credit do not entitle the seller to
payment.2 Without a waiver from its customer, the issuing bank is le
gally entitled to, and surely will demand, strict compliance with these
terms.3 It is only the voluntary foregoing by the buyer-applicant of its
own unambiguous formal power, which is essentially always forth
coming, that enables the seller to draw on the letter of credit. Thus,
the normal course of a letter-of-credit transaction at least initially
places the seller at the mercy of the buyer.
Given these empirical findings, it is difficult to believe that the per
sistent use of letters of credit in commercial transactions has anything
to do with their theoretical potential to ensure that the seller actually
gets paid. It is difficult to believe, but not impossible. Mann recog
nizes that his evidence does not conclusively refute the traditional
view that the principal function of the letter of credit is to assure pay
ment. At least one plausible conceptual account of the letter of credit
remains that is consistent both with the new, surprising empirics and
the old idea that the commercial letter of credit is primarily an atomic
element of the payment system. The traditional view does not depend

* Visiting Assistant Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law;
Chicago;J.D. 1985, Yale.-Ed.

A.B. 1981, University of

1. See generally Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Letters of Credit in Payment Transactions,
98 MICH. L. REV. 2494 (2000).

2 See id. at 2502-05.
3. See id. at 2499-501; see also U.C.C. § 5-108(a) (1999) (stating issuer's obligation to
honor letter of credit depends on strict compliance with terms and conditions of letter of
credit).
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on the legal enforceability of letters of credit because one does not
need legal rights to feel assured of payment.
The account that I propose begins by identifying and contemplat
ing the consequences of a likely disjunction in the locus within the firm
(particularly the seller's firm) of the agency costs generated in the is
suance of letters of credit, on the one hand, and in the performance of
the conditions required before the seller is entitled to draw on the let
ter of credit on the other. Imagine a straightforward, very large one
time sale of a commodity by a seller who routinely does business
around the world, and a buyer located in a country where the seller
has little or no experience. The seller is represented by a firm-specific
marketing representative who, lacking sufficient information about
the buyer's reliability, demands a letter of credit. The seller wants the
letter of credit only as a means of assuring payment. The buyer
agrees. The terms of the letter of credit could, in theory, be worked
out by the agents who struck the deal themselves. Alternatively, the
parties, after agreeing on a particular issuing bank, might simply adopt
and adapt a form of letter of credit routinely utilized by the bank; in
deed, the bank might insist that the letter of credit be based on such a
form. They could hand the matter over to lawyers, in or out of house,
and the bank's lawyers will probably need to look at the resulting pa
pers before the bank commits itself. The letter of credit that the bank
finally issues will contain specific terms, ordinarily requiring that a
particular set of documents evidencing shipment of the goods be pre
sented to the bank in a particular manner within a particular time
frame. Information as to precisely which documents must be pre
sented to the bank, and when and how they need to get there, will be
within the purview of any one agent or group of several agents of the
seller, who may or may not be employees of the firm. There is no a
priori means of determining where that information is. What the
seller needs to do in order to get paid under the letter of credit may be
costly to determine.
The seller ships the goods. It is time to figure out how to draw on
the letter of credit. Who will handle that task? Perhaps the job will go
to an employee in the department that handled the shipping; maybe it
will be a more specialized person in the Accounts Receivable depart
ment. Whoever has the job of assembling the documentary evidence
of the seller's performance will not necessarily know what the par
ticular letter of credit requires, in terms of substance, mode of presen
tation, or timing. In fact, it seems unlikely that the party who must as
semble the documents that the seller will present to the issuing bank
had anything to do with the process by which the letter of credit was
issued. That person could search for those requirements but the
search would be costly, both in terms of locating the source of the
relevant information and learning the requirements. When she finds
and learns the specific conditions, it may tum out that they require
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conduct that is not part of the seller's standard method of complying
with letter-of-credit conditions. That will further reduce the seller's
share of the surplus that the sale created.
It will surely be tempting to achieve at least some degree of stan
dardization in the process of presenting documents to the issuing
bank. The costs saved by doing so could well exceed the costs associ
ated with the increased risk of the issuing bank's refusal to allow a
draw on the letter of credit for failure to satisfy its conditions. One of
Mann's central discoveries is that the risk of the bank not paying be
cause the documents presented fail to conform in some respect to the
formal terms of the letter of credit is astonishingly low. But such data
may be consistent with the use of letters of credit primarily as a pay
ment instrument. Even without an issuing bank's pressuring its cus
tomer to waive the conditions, there is good reason to expect a ra
tional buyer to waive the conditions, at least in cases where the seller
seems to have performed the underlying contract adequately. The
buyer would remain obligated under that underlying contract. The
buyer would rarely refuse to waive the conditions of the letter of
credit draw if it intended to pay for the goods. So, refusal to waive
would ordinarily imply refusal to pay. Sometimes refusing the waiver
would be pointless because the seller can simply resubmit documents
that conform. The buyer will often waive even when the seller will not
be in a position to resubmit, say, because too much time has passed.
The buyer will assign an expected cost of refusing to pay that will be
the sum of its expected legal liability and the expected cost of the re
putational and other nonlegal sanctions it could suffer. If that cost is
greater than the benefit of not paying, a rational buyer might as well
waive. A rational and sufficiently informed seller (with a particular
range of attitudes toward risk) who does the analysis just outlined
might well have good reason to save the costs of conforming to the re
quirements of particular letters of credit.
Such a decision could be expected to occur even in one-time trans
actions. A repeat-play relationship between the buyer and seller
should significantly enhance the likelihood that the buyer will waive
the letter-of-credit conditions. Part of the cost that the buyer would
bear by refusing to waive the conditions in an ongoing relationship
would lie in the damage to the relationship itself - a cost that obvi
ously grows with the expected value of future dealings. As such, the
evidence of how the parties actually behave in the typical letter-of
credit setting, coupled with the traditional view of the letter of credit
as principally a payment mechanism, makes the letter of credit an
other potentially interesting case study in the important body of litera
ture that views the formal rules of a particular contractual relationship
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as rules to be applied in an end-game situation.4 Where the expected
future value of a relationship approaches zero, one would expect to
see increased opportunistic resort to strict contractual terms.
Of
course, in such circumstances the seller, perceiving that the buyer is
more likely to refuse to waive strict application of the letter-of-credit
terms, will place a higher value on strict conf.ormity with those terms,
and would accordingly be more likely to incur the intrafirm agency
costs necessary to implement strict compliance with the particular let
ter of credit in question. It would be interesting to know whether the
rate of compliance that one finds correlates with the length and stabil
ity of the underlying commercial relationship. It can only be hoped
that Mann's important study will foster the development of more so
phisticated models that justify the continued use of the traditional let
ter of credit, and that he will use the extensive data set that he has
generated in preparing his current work - which he modestly calls
"preliminary" - to test those models.
The alternative functions of letters of credit that Mann describes
are all consistent with the data regarding rates of initial presentation
compliance by sellers, and of waiver by buyers. The letter of credit
serves as a signal to the seller of the buyer's reliability because a bank
would not vouch for an unreliable party. It also signals the legitimacy
of the transaction itself since banks are relatively advantaged in de
termining, or more highly motivated to determine, that the transaction
in question is not merely a ruse to circumvent licensing requirements,
launder money or the like. The desire for transaction verification may
come from a seller motivated to avoid potential secondary liability for
facilitating unlawful conduct, or directly from regulations which re
quire that the transactions in question be implicitly verified by a suffi
ciently reputable organization. Finally, the letter of credit also can
minimize agency costs within the seller's firm because the agents who
generate the sales will usually not be the ones charged with determin
ing the firm's willingness to undertake particular classes of credit risks.
That each of these functions commonly plays an important role in mo
tivating the resort to letters of credit also gains support to varying de
grees through the interviews that Mann has conducted with bank per
sonnel active in administering letters of credit to supplement his
objective statistics.5
Each of these alternative explanations, tied together nicely by
Mann's reconceptualization of the letter of credit from a payment
mechanism to a "verification institution," clearly plays some role in
the continued resort to letters of credit, even though they are among

4. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Coun: Rethinking the Code's
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA.L.REV.1765 (1996).
5. See, e.g., Mann, supra note 1, at 2508-09, notes accompanying text on 2517-19, 2524,
2527-29, and notes accompanying text on 2532-36.
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the more expensive means of ensuring payment. The present study
does not purport to inquire into or offer any evidence of the relative
frequency with which each of these functions plays a significant role in
the generation of a letter of credit. However, this reorientation of the
theoretical foundations of the letter of credit has identifiable and sig
nificant implications for the agenda of future empirical research. The
findings already obtained probably contain strong indicia of the rela
tive significance of the different verification functions identified.
The degree to which each of the three verification functions Mann
has identified motivates the use of a letter of credit ought to correlate
significantly with the transactors' decision to continue utilizing the let
ter of credit over the course of a sustained relationship. Consider the
first verification function: the letter of credit is an instrument by
which a bank, as the party that can at the lowest cost obtain informa
tion regarding the buyer's creditworthiness, signals the seller that the
risk of the buyer's default is acceptably low. Such information will be
important early in a relationship because the seller has no personal in
formation about the buyer. Over the course of a relationship solidi
fied by iterated success in individuated transactions, the seller does
gain its own specific information about the buyer. The buyer's will
ingness to waive deviations between the seller's documentary presen
tations and the express terms of the particular letter of credit may ac
tually hasten the process by which the seller comes to trust the buyer.
With or without such opportunities for a buyer to signal its willingness
to cooperate, the marginal utility of the bank's signal about the buyer
should begin to decrease more or less quickly. At some point the
marginal increase in the seller's expected gain from the transaction at
tributable to the bank's signal about the buyer's reliability will be in
sufficient to justify the cost of the continued deployment of the letter
of credit. At that point one would expect to see the parties shift from
reliance on a letter of credit to a cheaper method of bonding the
buyer's performance, such as a documentary collection transaction.
The "transaction verification" function presents a more compli
cated picture. Insofar as the need for verifying the authenticity of a
sale comes from the seller concerned with either nonpayment or sec
ondary liability, it can be expected to follow more or less the same
course as the "vouching for the buyer" function. After enough good
sales, the seller will be confident enough in the buyer's reliability that
the increase in comfort that a letter of credit delivers won't be worth
the price. But if the letter of credit instead serves to assure a regula
tory authority that the sale is real, it is unlikely that the demand for
such assurance will be particularly sensitive to the length or stability of
a particular relationship. The optimal precision in the applicable
regulation is likely to be based on the nature of the transaction rather
than the history of dealings between particular parties, a factor that
would significantly increase the regulator's cost of determining
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whether a particular transaction falls within the scope of the regula
tion. Accordingly, the use of the letter of credit would persist over the
entire course of even the most successful relationship.
The need for intrafirm verification will perhaps also decline over
the course of a repeat-play relationship. Trust can mollify the need for
costly constraints on transactional form aimed at constraining risk
taking to the appropriate level in an organizational hierarchy in much
the same way as general reputation can. Imagine a rule within a
seller's firm that transactions over a certain amount require a letter of
credit. Such a rule could be expected to give more discretion to low
level agents dealing with longstanding customers. It would be just as
rational to design such a rule as it would to require a lower level of
approval to sell to Microsoft or General Motors on open credit than to
offer the same terms to an e-business start-up company. A firm gov
erned by this rule would resort to letters of credit less in repeat..play
relationships. Mann's subjective empirical work with bank officers
confirms this phenomenon.
Mann's groundbreaking article demarcates several new paths for
both theoretical and empirical research. These paths point to a deeper
understanding of areas beyond the basic commercial letter of credit.
The letter of credit is a form of agreement that may be regulated by
local law, the Uniform Commercial Code, or by international conven
tion, the Uniform Customs and Practice. Mann's article suggests that
there may be significant variations between letter-of-credit practices in
domestic and international transactions. How extensive are these dif
ferences and can they be conceptually correlated with differences in
the underlying legal regimes? The letter of credit thus seems to offer
an excellent opportunity for studying the effect of background alloca
tions of right - "the shadow of the law" - on actual commercial
practices. Mann's article also has implications for the investigation of
transactional forms related to the straight letter of credit in a basic
sales transaction. Given that one basic function of the letter of credit
is to sever the source of the obligation to pay from the actual practice
of payment, whether or not it operates primarily as a payment mecha
nism, studying the choice of a letter of credit over a secondary obliga
tion such as the standby letter of credit promises a good chance to
verify and expand on important recent work in the legal and economic
foundations of the guarantee contract.6 Mann's data and his analysis
both make possible and demand a number of promising lines of future
research.

6. See Avery Wiener Katz, An Economic Analysis of the Guaranty Contract, 66 U. CHI.
L. REV. 47 (1999).

